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TOO MANY COOKS SPOIL THE BROTH: 
HOW THE TRAGEDY OF THE ANTICOMMONS EMERGES IN ORGANIZATIONS  
 
Abstract 
In organizations, conflict often revolves around commons resources because they are critical for 
influence, performance, and organizational survival. Research on property rights, territoriality, 
and social dilemmas suggests that to reduce such conflict, organizations should facilitate the 
(psychological) privatization of commons resources. We complement these three literatures by 
drawing from the legal, organizational, and social psychology literatures to model how 
psychologically privatizing organizational commons resources – to prevent a tragedy of the 
commons (an overuse problem) – can lead to the emergence of equivalently problematic tragedy 
in organizations: the tragedy of the anticommons (an underuse problem). Our model contributes 
to these literatures by conceptualizing a bottom-up behavioral process (in contrast to institutional 
allocation) of property distribution that leads to the emergence of the tragedy of the 
anticommons. The implications of this bottom-up behavioral process for property rights theory, 
territoriality theory, and the social dilemma paradigm are discussed. 
 
 
Keywords: anticommons resource, commons resource, egocentrism, fairness, property rights, 
psychological ownership, territoriality, tragedy of the commons, tragedy of the anticommons 
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Many conflicts in organizational life revolve around a commons resource. A commons is 
a shared resource for which access to users is not restricted, and use of the resource subtracts 
from the other users’ benefit (Feeny, Berkes, McCay, & Acheson, 1990). As first observed by 
Hardin (1968) in his seminal article “The tragedy of the commons”, when many people have the 
privilege to use a commons resource and no one user has the right to exclude another, not only is 
conflict likely, but tragedies of resource inefficiency and exhaustion emerge. Considering that a 
primary goal of any organization is to use resources effectively and efficiently to achieve its 
goals (Katz & Kahn, 1978), conflict involving commons resources can pose a significant threat 
to an organization’s performance (Bluedorn & Waller, 2006; Gupta & Govindarajan, 1986). To 
illustrate an organizational commons, at a small university, a campus-wide intranet for donor 
information was created. In the database, each department’s advancement administrators could 
retrieve particular donor contact information to then approach and request support. However, 
each department’s contact of a donor typically makes that donor less (or un-) able to contribute 
to other departments, thereby reducing the intranets benefit to the other departments. Thus it is in 
each department’s interest to contact as many donors as possible. The result: a financially 
exhausted (and perhaps annoyed) pool of donors reluctant to give in the future (see also Aquino 
& Reed, 1998; Ingram & Inman, 1996; Kim & Mahoney, 2002; King, Lenox, & Barnett, 2002; 
Kramer, 1991, for additional organizational examples).1
To resolve (and even avoid) the tragedy of the commons, a variety of solutions have been 
proposed (see Kollock, 1998; Kopelman, Weber, & Messick, 2002, for reviews). One popular 
solution, suggested by the property rights, territoriality, and social dilemmas literatures is 
privatizing the commons resources (e.g., Brown, Lawrence, & Robinson, 2005; Smith, 1981; van 
Dijk & Wilke, 1997). Broadly speaking, privatization involves transferring some or all of the 
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ownership and/or control of a public resource to private parties – such as individuals, teams, or 
departments (Zahra, Ireland, Gutierrez, & Hitt, 2000).  
Privatizing a commons is theorized to encourage efficient and effective management of 
the commons because, economically, the user incurs not only the benefits of the costs of its 
management (e.g., Smith, 1981) and, psychologically, the user has an increased social 
responsibility toward their portion of the commons (e.g., van Dijk & Wilke, 1997). Such 
privatization occurs through territorial marking and defending behaviors such as policies, 
procedures, job descriptions, signs, locks, and passwords (D’Amico & Block, 2007; Kärrholm, 
2007). Privatizing behaviors can occur formally by some centralized authority granting legal 
ownership or informally through psychological ownership (Brown et al., 2005; Pierce, Kostova, 
& Dirks, 2001). The current paper focuses on psychological ownership or “a feeling of 
possessiveness and of being psychologically tied to an object” (Pierce et al., 2001: 299). This 
focus is made because, as suggested by Nobel Laureate Douglass North’s (1990) seminal work 
on property, even when a “leviathan” (or central authority) arbitrates disputes of ownership 
(Hobbes, 1907 [1651]), psychological ownership may remain and motivate individuals to follow 
informal “rules of the game” about governing the commons that diverge from formal rules.  
In maintaining that psychological ownership as an effective solution to the management 
of commons resources, the property rights, territoriality, and social dilemma literatures assume 
that there is shared understanding among users about governing the commons resource. That is, 
users are assumed to agree on who should have the authority to restrict access to and use of the 
commons resource. Often however, disagreement arises over who should control what in 
organizations (Brown & Robinson, 2011). Even Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom’s (1990: 12-13) 
seminal work on commons governance suggests that characteristics of the resource and its users 
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can make privatization, whether formal or informal, challenging to form and sustain. What 
happens when users, left to negotiate the privatization of a commons resource, do not share the 
same perceptions about how it should be governed? We maintain that attempting to privatize a 
commons resource can lead to the “tragedy of the anticommons” (Heller, 1998).  
This paper takes a bottom-up approach and explores how excessive territorial behavior in 
organizations transforms a commons resource into an anticommons resource. An anticommons 
(Heller, 1998) is a non-substitutable resource over which multiple actors claim rights to restrict 
access to the resource and no one has an effective privilege of use. We maintain that individual 
actors – be they persons, groups, or departments – with overlapping (psychological) claims to a 
commons resource may unintentionally facilitate the emergence of an anticommons resource. 
Consequently, overlapping psychological claims obstruct efforts to deploy anticommons 
resources in ways valuable to the organization, thereby impairing organizational effectiveness. 
Specifically, we propose that (1) resources that are difficult to divide, provide an unequal 
distribution of benefits, and have limited carrying capacity along with groups that are large and 
differentiated create environments where users experience an egocentric view of fairness and 
reactive egoism, (2) an egocentric view of fairness and reactive egoism results in over-marking 
and over-defending, territorial behavior, (3) over-marking and over-defending behaviors result in 
a commons resource becoming an anticommons resource, and (4) the carrying capacity of the 
commons resource moderates the effect territorial behavior has on the likelihood of the 
emergence of an anticommons resource.  
Our introduction of the tragedy of the anticommons to organization science makes three 
main contributions to theory on property rights, territoriality, and social dilemmas. First, a 
bottom-up approach to anticommons emergence highlights the role of perceptions when 
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attempting to form and enforce property rights, thereby exploring how social dynamics can 
impact property rights formation (Eggertsson, 1999). Second, whereas previous territoriality 
research focuses on individual outcome variables (Brown et al., 2005; Brown & Robinson, 
2011), we examine a potential, social outcome of marking and defending: gridlock of a shared 
resource (Heller, 2008). Third, we complement legal scholars and experiment economists top-
down approach to the tragedy of the anticommons by examining the psychological foundations 
of how anticommons resources emerge in organizations. In doing so, we answer Ostrom’s (1990: 
183) call to “further theoretical development … to explain and predict when … [users of a shared 
resource] are more likely to self-organize and effectively govern … and when they are more 
likely to fail”. 
   
MANAGING COMMONS RESOURCES IN ORGANIZATIONS:  
A BRIEF REVIEW AND INTEGRATION 
 In this section we, first, discuss how various characteristics of shared resources and its 
users create complications when attempting resource management. Second, we highlight 
integrate findings from the property rights, territoriality, and social dilemma literatures to 
introduce the tragedy of the anticommons to organization science.  
Characteristics of Resources and Users that Complicate Resource Management  
 Two general factors are considered when studying a shared resource: resource 
complexity and group (or user) complexity (Ostrom, 1990). Both factors can increase uncertainty 
surrounding the use of a shared resource, although in different ways. Resource complexity 
creates uncertainty surrounding the fairness of distributing and using the shared resource, while 
group complexity fosters uncertainty about a user’s willingness to sustain (or exploit) the shared 
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resource. Here we review three dimensions of resource complexity and two dimensions of user-
group complexity (henceforth group complexity).  
Resource complexity. Shared resources vary in divisibility or the ease of separating the 
resource’s benefits among users (Burger, Ostrom, Norsgaard, Policansky, & Goldstein, 2001). 
Specifically, some shared resources are difficult to divide or “lumpy” (Taylor & Ward, 1982); 
e.g., a commons resource may provide significant benefits to a user only when that individual 
utilizes a certain amount of it. Using any amount below this critical mass yields no or very little 
benefit. A department may need to tap into a certain number of donors from a shared intranet 
before it can justify fundraising events (e.g., gala events) that involve a fixed cost or require 
minimum participation. Similarly, a portion of a shared research laboratory may be of little value 
to any science team unless their portion contains two microscopes and six computers. When 
shared resources are easily divisible, it is easier for individuals to use social heuristics to divide it 
and meet their needs (de Kwaadsteniet, van Dijk, Wit, & de Cremer, 2006). For instance, if a 
commons resource can be divided easily among six users, then an equal-division rule is often 
employed with each individual getting one-sixth (Allison & Messick, 1990). Yet, when shared 
resources are not easily divisible, uncertainty arises as to what constitutes an appropriate (Weber, 
Kopelman, & Messick, 2004), fair division (Messick, 1993).  
A second structural characteristic is the value distribution to users. Often the distribution 
of benefits of a resource is not uniform to organizational members. Some individuals value the 
resource more (or get more value out of the resource) than others (Northcraft, Neale, Tenbrunsel, 
& Thomas, 1996). Consider a group of doctoral students viewed as a shared pool of labor (Rutte, 
1990). Even assuming there is a one-to-one ratio of doctoral students to faculty (the shared 
resource is easily divisible), some faculty mesh better with some doctoral students compared to 
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others, and some faculty have greater overlap in research interests with some students compared 
to others. With such asymmetry, distributing this resource’s benefits is challenging. Asymmetric 
distributions of benefits are more common than symmetric (Murnighan & King, 1992; van Dijk 
& Wilke, 1993), and important because they create increased uncertainty (and subsequent 
conflict) about what constitutes appropriate, fair distributions of the resource (Bazerman, 
Curhan, Moore, & Valley, 2000; Wade-Benzoni, Tenbrunsel, & Bazerman, 1996).  
Third, shared resources vary in carrying capacity (Kollock, 1998). When it becomes 
scarce, a shared resource can be used only so much before it is exhausted (Kramer, 1989; Schiff, 
1995). Consider Rutte’s (1990) case study of a pharmaceutical laboratory where research 
scientists (each seeking to complete independent projects) shared a commons resource pool of 
drug analysts. These analysts have a certain number of hours in a day that they may run analyses 
on drugs. If the total number of priority requests made by the scientists surpass the analysts’ 
available time, productivity as a whole suffers. As this commons resource reaches its carrying 
capacity, uncertainty over whether others will exercise self-restraint increases (Kramer, 1989). 
Individuals who perceive a shared resource as becoming stressed (the carrying capacity is being 
reached) aggressively attempt to secure a portion of that resource for themselves (Samuelson & 
Messick, 1986).  
Group complexity. Users of a shared resource can also vary in complexity. First consider 
the group size or number of users. As the number of users increases so does the likelihood of the 
shared resource being abused (Hamburger, Guyer, & Fox, 1975; Kollock, 1998). The reasons for 
this include (1) there are more users equating to greater total use and faster depletion of the 
resource and (2) more potential users increases fear that the resource will not last long (Kramer, 
1989). Consequently, individuals may begin using a shared resource up defensively in 
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anticipation that others will offensively exhaust it (Ostrom, Burger, Field, Norgaard, & 
Policansky, 1999).  
A second characteristic is group differentiation or the “number of distinct subgroups or 
decision-making units within a group” (Kramer, 1989: 161). Brewer’s (1979) seminal work on 
the minimal intergroup paradigm reminds us that those similar to us are often perceived as more 
trustworthy, friendly, and reliable than those perceived as different (see also Brewer & Silver, 
1978). In relation to shared resources, Kramer and Brewer (1984) found that when subgroups are 
made more salient, in-group favoritism and out-group suspicion strengthens, thereby leading 
subgroup members to consume the commons resource faster, fearful that out-group members 
will do the same.  
In both cases, group size and differentiation enhance an individual’s uncertainty about 
others’ behavior about using a shared resource. As uncertainty about others’ behavior increases, 
an individual’s tendency to behave self-interestedly (even at another’s expense) increases (Luo, 
2007; McCarter, Rockmann, & Northcraft, 2010). 
Governing Shared Resources through de Facto Privatization 
When individuals consider altering the control over shared property, two methods are 
often employed. The first method, advocated originally by Hobbes (1907 [1651]) and later by 
Hardin (1968), is using a centralized authority to dictate and enforce the use of the resource. 
However, as observed by Crowe (1969) and later by Ostrom (1990), there are be various reasons 
for why a central authority would be either impractical or impossible: e.g., incomplete 
information may only be available to the authority, the authority may be unable to effectively 
monitor and sanction users, and high transaction costs of administration may impede the 
authority from operating effectively.  
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Alternatively, a second popular remedy, and the focus of the current paper, is 
privatization. Ostrom’s (1990) research on commons resource governance observes that allowing 
individuals to negotiate rights of ownership can lead to mutual self-enforcing agreements that 
circumvent conflict (see also Ostrom, Walker, & Gardner, 1992). Complementing Ostrom’s 
observation, three independently developed literatures submit privatizing commons resources 
either formally or informally as an efficient solution to the commons resource problem.  
Property rights. Property rights are a mechanism for organizing and reducing uncertainty 
about what belongs to who and who is responsible for what (Etzioni, 1991; Langlois, 2002). The 
economics, organizational economics, and political science domains view property rights as 
“social institutions that define or delimit the range of privileges granted to individuals to specific 
resources” (Kim & Mahoney, 2002: 226). Social institutions refer to rules used by a collective 
and can be developed formally or de facto (Alchian, 1977; Knight, 1998; Ostrom, 1986). 
Germane to our discussion, de facto property rights are informal rights that “originate among 
resource users” and are socially reinforced – rather than developed and enforced by an 
administrator or the state (Schlager & Ostrom, 1992: 254). For instance, users of an intranet 
commons may create informal rules (a de facto property rights regime) about the intranet’s use, 
independent of administrators’ wishes or legislation.  
The property rights literature focuses on how privatization affects incentives (Demsetz, 
1967; Gordon, 1954) and how individuals interact with each other (in a proper way [the root of 
property]) in relation to an object (Stake, 2004). Privatizing a commons resource – e.g., 
subdividing a commons office area into private offices – internalizes the costs of using the 
resource through the right of exclusion and is intended to motivate individuals to effectively 
manage their portion of the commons (De Alessi, 2003; Welch, 1983). Cass and Edney (1978), 
11 
 
for example, found that overusing a commons was less likely under a “private property system” 
compared to a “commons property system”. They maintained this was because transforming a 
commons resource into a “system of [private] territories” increased an individual’s perceived 
responsibility over the resource.  
Two insights from property rights theory are germane to our present discussion. First, de 
facto property rights regimes may be unilaterally attempted when one party believes that other 
parties will validate a rule (de Jasay, 2008). For instance, an individual may attempt to use the 
“first possession rule” or “first come, first serve” (Libecap, 2007) to communicate possession of 
a resource to others (see also Liliveld, van Dijk, & van Beest, 2008). As illustrated here, conflict 
will be avoided assuming there is a shared understanding or socially accepted norm of “first 
come, first serve”. Second, property rights can be partitioned: individuals can hold rights over 
different aspects of the same resource (Alchian, 1977). Schlager and Ostrom (1992) observed 
that property rights may be “bundled” such that, for instance, one individual can access a 
commons resource but may not have the right to use (withdraw from) that resource, another can 
have withdrawal rights but not the ability to alter how others use the resource, and yet another 
individual may have authority to transfer their rights to another but cannot access or withdraw 
from the resource. To better understand the significance of bundling property rights, we turn to 
the territoriality literature.  
Territoriality. Drawing from geography (e.g., Sack, 1986), human ecology (e.g., McCay 
& Acheson, 1990), and environmental psychology (Gifford, 1997), organizational behavior 
scholars studying territoriality submit that marking and defending resources “creates socially 
agreed upon territories” (Brown et al., 2005: 587) and, these behaviors reduce conflict and avoid 
exploiting an organization’s resources (Acheson, 1975). Even though initial conflict may arise 
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over what belongs to whom, territoriality theory maintains that marking and defending territories 
creates a shared understanding that eventually extinguishes conflict (Brown et al., 2005). 
Congruent to the property rights literature, the territoriality literature submits that individuals can 
attempt to unilaterally control resources (through marking and defending), and conflict may 
occur when there is disagreement about what allocation rules are acceptable.  
Two forms of territorial behavior relevant to our current discussion are control-oriented 
marking and anticipatory defending. Control-oriented marking communicates to others an 
individual’s claim over a resource; e.g., this is mine and not yours (Brown et al., 2005). Lobster 
fishermen marking buoys with colors to signify their fleet’s “turf” illustrates control-oriented 
marking when negotiating the use of a commons lobster bed (Acheson, 1975). Anticipatory 
defending involves an individual making it difficult for others to access (or, more generally, use) 
a resource in the future (Brown et al., 2005). An individual password protecting a public 
computer in an office commons would be an example of anticipatory defending (Brown & 
Lawrence, 2011). Both forms of territorial behavior involve one individual attempting to restrict 
others’ access and use to a resource.  
Two implications from the territoriality literature are relevant to the current paper. First, 
individuals mark or defend resources without having actual (legal) ownership of them. An 
individual – through using, associating, or investing (time, energy, other private resources) in a 
resource – can develop psychological ownership of that resource (Pierce et al., 2001). 
Consequentially, an individual expresses ownership and control over that resource through 
marking and defending: they do not actually own the resource but act as if they do (Brown & 
Robinson, 2007).2 A second insight is that several individuals can perceive that they 
psychologically own the same (portion of a) resource. When multiple people perceive they own a 
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resource, conflict can occur as these individuals seek to (re-)gain control from intruders (Brown 
& Robinson, 2011). Because different individuals may perceive they own a (portion of a) 
resource, they may attempt to unilaterally mark and defend, forming de facto property rights, 
over the same portions of a commons resource.  
Social dilemmas. The social dilemma literature, from social psychology and game 
theory, views commons resource management as a take-some dilemma (Dawes, 1980). The take-
some dilemma is that, while it is in each individual’s self-interest to take as much of the 
commons resource as possible in the short term, if enough choose this strategy, then the 
commons becomes overused and everyone is worse off in the long term (Messick & Brewer, 
1983). Thus the dilemma is that an individual can and maximize self-interest by not cooperating 
(regardless of what others do) but everyone receives a lower payoff if all are non-cooperative 
compared to if they were cooperative (Dawes, 1980). Individual rationality leads to group 
irrationality in commons resource dilemmas (Dawes & Messick, 2000). 
Different from property rights theory, social dilemma theorists maintain that, independent 
of altering the payoffs associated with using the commons, altering how its users perceive the 
resource context can also lead to effective resource management (e.g., Messick, 1999). Altering 
how a situation is perceived (such as how a resource is labeled) changes what rules individuals 
deem appropriate when using a resource and, consequentially, can affect commons resource 
usage (March, 1994; Weber et al., 2004). van Dijk and Wilke (1997) found that merely changing 
the label of a commons resource from “collective property” to “partitioned (private) property” 
increased an individual’s perceived social responsibility which then decreased their tendency to 
overuse the resource (see Liberman, Samuels, & Ross, 2004, for a similar finding).  
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Recently brought to fore in the social dilemma literature is that individuals can perceive 
the same situation – such as governing a commons resource – differently (Tenbrunsel & 
Northcraft, 2010). Kelley and Thibaut’s (1978) seminal work on interdependent decision making 
reminds us that how incentives and behavior are perceived and how they are structured and 
related can diverge dramatically. As suggested by recent work on decision frames in social 
dilemmas (Northcraft & Tenbrunsel, 2011), non-aligned perceptions about how a resource 
should be used create negative effects on commons resource usage. For instance, an individual 
may use a commons resource – and believe they do so – quite responsibly, while others see their 
behavior as abusive. Connecting social dilemma and territoriality literatures, when an individual 
perceives others’ use of a commons resource as inappropriate, that individual may take steps to 
preserve their own use of it through marking and defending behavior. The result: escalating 
conflict and further stress on the commons resource.  
Literature Integration and a Social Dilemma New to Organization Science 
Integrating these literatures (property rights, territoriality, and social dilemmas) results in 
several insights and an emerging gap. From territoriality research, individuals mark and defend 
resources even when they do not technically own (or hold legal property rights over) those 
resource (e.g., Brown et al., 2005). From the property rights literature, rights governing a 
commons resource can be partitioned: different people can have control over different elements 
of the same resource (e.g., Ostrom & Schlager, 1996). The territoriality and property rights 
literatures assume there must exist shared understanding among users over how a resource will 
be used or who controls access to avoid conflict (Eggertsson, 2003; Greenberg, Rohe, & 
Williams, 1982). Relaxing this assumption, social dilemma research suggests that conflict over 
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commons resources is a manifestation of mis-aligned perceptions about what is appropriate use 
of the commons resource (e.g., Tenbrunsel & Northcraft, 2010).  
With these insights in mind, we introduce a social dilemma to the management discipline: 
Individuals psychologically owning overlapping portions of a commons resource may mark and 
defend those overlapping portions of the commons in attempt to avoid overusing it. However, if 
enough individuals mark and defend overlapping portions of a commons resource, the resource 
ceases being vulnerable to overuse and becomes subject to underuse. This is because multiple 
individuals have means and the motivation to restrict each other from using the resource. 
Underused, the resource may no longer provide its full benefit to its users, creating opportunity 
costs that negatively affect an organization’s functioning (Porter & van der Linde, 1995).  
Such anticommons resources (Heller, 1998), are presumed to exist ex-ante due to ill-
conceived allocation of legal rights, and the existing research on this social dilemma supports 
this presumption (Buchanan & Yoon, 2000; van Hiel, Vanneste, & de Cremer, 2008; Ziedonis, 
2004). The property rights, territoriality, and social dilemmas literatures, nor organization 
science for that matter, consider the psychological antecedents to anticommons formation. The 
question remains of how anticommons resources emerge in organizations the first place. To 
address this gap we turn to the law and social psychology literatures. 
 
THE EMERGENCE OF THE TRAGEDY OF THE ANTICOMMONS THROUGH SELF-
SERVING BIASES AND TERRITORIAL BEHAVIOR 
This section accomplishes two things. First, we ground the reader in the tragedy of the 
anticommons. Second, we integrate this metaphor, based in the law domain, with the social 
psychology literature on self-serving biases and the effects of ambiguity to decision making 
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understand the psychological foundations of why anticommons resources may emerge through 
territorial behavior.  
The Tragedy of the Anticommons 
Introduced by Heller (1998), the “tragedy of the anticommons” describes a situation 
where resources are prone to inefficient underuse because too many owners hold rights (or the 
ability) of exclusion. Anticommons resources are, conceptually, mirror images of commons 
resources (Heller, 2008). Commons resources face the tragedy of overuse from users not being 
able to restrict access (Hardin, 1968), whereas anticommons resources face the tragedy of 
underuse from users being able to restrict access (Heller, 1998). Based in the law domain, Heller 
(1999, 2008) submits that the way property rights regimes (by a central authority) are designed 
and imposed leads to tragic underuse of resources. In the current paper we extend Heller’s 
conception of the anticommons by proposing that within organizations, individuals attempt to 
create de facto property rights by marking and defending commons resources they 
psychologically own. Through this alternative mechanism, anticommons resources emerge in 
organizations without the participation of a central authority.  
Heller offers two examples of anticommons resources: Russian storefronts and 
pharmaceuticals. During the Soviet Union’s transition from a socialist to a market economy, 
rights were made alienable in the hope that individual owners would trade them to more 
productive use. The problem, however, was that the government distributed rights over resources 
to too many people. An example involved upscale stores in Moscow (Heller, 1998), which ended 
up in the hands of multiple owners. While one person may have been initially endowed with the 
right to sell in a single store, another was endowed with the right to receive sale revenue, and yet 
others had the right to lease, to receive lease revenue, to occupy, and determine use. Nobody 
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received a standard bundle of rights and the many rights-owners excluded each other from using 
a given storefront, which led to both individual and collective inefficiencies. Thus, in post-
transition Russia, over-fragmentation of property rights led merchants to sell the influx of 
merchandise from the West in flimsy metal kiosks on the sidewalks. Both merchants and 
customers shivered through the harsh Moscow winters, when several feet behind them stores that 
could provide heat and security lay empty (Heller, 1998). Similarly, over-fragmentation of 
intellectual property rights has led to inefficiencies in the U.S. biomedical industry, with 
detrimental consequences for the provision of healthcare. Because U.S. patent policy grants 
multiple owners rights in fragments of a single gene, each fragment owner can block other 
fragment owners from acquiring a coherent bundle of rights in the full-length gene, which is 
often necessary for producing the drugs that actually save lives (Heller & Eisenberg, 1998).  
As suggested by these examples, Heller (1999) maintains that if individual’s block 
enough of a shared resource it may become unusable. This is similar to social dilemma and 
territoriality theories that predict if enough individuals act self-interestedly in having a resource 
meet their needs in the short term that the resource can cease giving any benefits or meeting 
anyone’s needs in the long term (Brown et al., 2005; Taylor & Ward, 1982). Extending this idea, 
we submit that if enough individuals mark and defend (portions of) a commons resource to meet 
their needs in the short term that an anticommons resource may emerge being underused in the 
long term. Returning to the donor intranet database example, the university sought to navigate 
the overuse of the donor commons by allowing advancement administrators to mark particular 
donors as “taken” or not approachable for later use. This was done by either making notes by the 
donor’s name or limiting the contact and personal information about the donor. Conflicts arose 
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when several departments viewed a donor as “theirs” and these departments restricted each 
other’s access to the donor’s information. The intranet to this day is frozen and left unused.  
Top-down and bottom-up approaches. Heller’s (1998, 1999, 2008, 2011) work primarily 
takes a top-down approach to anticommons resources emergence and uses examples where 
central authorities (e.g., the government) arrange formal property rights in such a way that 
(perhaps unintentionally) creates anticommons resources. This top-down approach offers one 
explanation for anticommons emergence: the structure of formal property rights by a central 
authority creates excessive information (or transaction) costs (Williamson, 1979) associated with 
coordinating usage of a shared resource, resulting in that resource being underutilized (Heller, 
1998; Heller & Eisenberg, 1998). Maurer’s (2006) study of the failed attempt to create a 
worldwide human mutations database supports this top-down explanation: the number of 
organizations involved and uncertainty surrounding the costs and benefits of the database created 
excessive information costs “deadlocking” negotiations over the database’s creation. 
We take a bottom-up approach to anticommons emergence. Heller speculates that 
anticommons resources can be exacerbated by individuals falling victim to psychological biases 
(e.g. over-valuing a fragment of property they [perceive to] own), leading them to actions (over-
pricing or hold-ups) that unintentionally continue to lock-up a resource (e.g., Heller & Eisenberg, 
1998). However, the psychological and behavioral antecedents of the anticommons resources is 
hitherto unexplored academic territory. Integrating the three literatures on (psychological) 
privatization with the social psychology literature on self-serving biases assists in understanding 
how and why anticommons resources behaviorally emerge from the bottom up.  
Self-serving Biases 
 Notions of fairness are central to conflicts about resource distribution (Deutsch, 1975). 
We view fairness as involving an individual comparing how much of a resource they control 
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relative to others. This comparison influences an individual’s satisfaction with the outcome 
(Messick & Sentis, 1983). Fairness is at the heart of conflict over commons resources (Baland & 
Platteau, 1999). Property rights and the social dilemma literatures identify fairness of outcomes 
(or distributive justice) as a mechanism explaining how much of a commons resource an 
individual may unilaterally attempt to take or leave to another (Fahr & Irlenbusch, 2000; 
Hoffman & Spitzer, 1985). Although suggested to explain how resources are marked and 
protected, fairness has received less attention among territoriality scholars (Murphy, 1990). 
Integrating concepts of territoriality to fairness judgments, individuals may mark and defend 
portions of a commons resource as a function of what they perceive is their “fair share” of that 
resource.  
Fairness is a perception prone to self-serving biases (Messick & Sentis, 1979) and 
suspicion (Messick & Sentis, 1983). It is easier for an individual to recall, access, and process 
their own needs, contributions, preferences, and interests compared to doing the same for others’ 
(Babcock & Loewenstein, 1997). After an individual retrieves information, information favoring 
one’s own interests is found to be given greater weight compared to others’ (Babcock, 
Loewenstein, Issacharoff, & Camerer, 1995). Because information access, retrieval, and 
processing are skewed to favor oneself, it is easier to justify resources being allocated in one’s 
favor. Consequently, individuals often make fairness judgments through an egocentric view of 
fairness: fairness judgments that favor one’s self as compared to others (Paese & Yonker, 2001). 
Indeed self-serving recall, access, and processing of information explain why individuals often 
experience conflict and subsequent impasse when negotiating the distributing limited resources 
(Thompson & Loewenstein, 1992).  
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In addition to making fairness judgments egocentrically, we often believe we are fairer 
and more cooperative than others (Krueger & Acevedo, 2007; Messick, Bloom, Boldizar, & 
Samuelson, 1985). As a result, while considering others’ needs, contributions, preferences and 
interests when allocating resources, we become suspicious that others will be unfair to (and take 
advantage of) us (Epley, Caruso, & Bazerman, 2006). Reactively, we take steps to protect 
ourselves from others’ opportunism (Rockmann & Northcraft, 2008). This “self-serving behavior 
in reaction to the [perceived] egoistic behavior of others” is termed reactive egoism and explains 
why individuals overharvest a commons resource when they think about what others will do 
(Epley et al., 2006: 873). Thus, whereas an egocentric view of fairness is an offensive bias, 
reactive egocentrism is a defensive bias.  
Considering that previous research on commons resources finds that egocentric views of 
fairness affect harvesting (or take) behavior (resource-use), we submit that such views can also 
affect territorial marking and defending behavior. An individual, perceiving to own a (portion of 
a) commons resource, may mark that portion to communicate control. Further, being suspicious 
about others attempting to breach the territory and use that portion, that individual may 
defensively engage in anticipatory defending. However, because of the tendency to make 
fairness judgments egocentrically, individuals may territorially mark and defend more of a 
commons resource than is perceived as fair by others. Indeed, individuals are motivated to avoid 
accepting outcomes imposed by others that they perceive as being unfair (Loewenstein, 
Thompson, & Bazerman, 1989). Reactively, users observing perceived unfair (or over) marking 
and defending (portions) of a commons resource may also begin to (over) mark and defend 
portions of the commons resource, creating an anticommons resource.  
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The Role of Ambiguity in Self-serving Biases 
Self-serving biases are fueled by uncertainty (Blader, 2007; Smith, 1987). As the criteria 
to a decision become more objective (or more certain), it becomes increasingly challenging for 
an individual to favor some pieces of information while discounting others (Felson, 1981). A 
situational characteristic that is the linchpin of self-serving biases is ambiguity or, in relation to 
our discussion, uncertainty about what constitutes a fair distribution of a commons resource and 
how others will behave (Wade-Benzoni et al., 1996).  
Messick (1993) submits that any social heuristic – for instance equity (or equality) 
judgments – is selected and used by an individual as a function of the ambiguity of the situation. 
Experimental research on negotiation (Thompson & Loewenstein, 1992) and social dilemmas 
(Wade-Benzoni et al., 1996) find that egocentric views of fairness abound in the presence of 
ambiguity and result in outcomes that are in no party’s interest: individuals attempt to consume 
more of a resource than what is perceived by others as fair. We submit that any factor increasing 
ambiguity about what constitutes the fair (psychological) privatization of a commons resource 
can lead to offensive, non-cooperative behavior in the form of control-oriented marking.  
Ambiguity has a similar affect on reactive egoism. Epley and Caruso’s (2009) review of 
perspective taking suggests that when there is uncertainty about others intentions and behavior in 
interdependent decision making tasks (such as commons resource governance) that individuals 
become less cooperative compared to when uncertainty is low. Caruso, Epley, and Bazerman 
(2007) found that when individuals preface their own decision with focusing on the uncertainty 
surrounding their partner’s likelihood of cooperating in a prisoners’ dilemma they are less likely 
to cooperate. Thus, factors that increase (or even highlight the) ambiguity surrounding what 
others will do can lead to defensive, non-cooperative behavior. Here we examine the territorial 
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behavior of anticipatory defending as a non-cooperative behavior that leads to anticommons 
resource emergence. In the next section we draw from group decision making and negotiation 
literatures to propose two factors that increase ambiguity. 
 
A MODEL OF ANTICOMMONS RESOURCE EMERGENCE 
This section presents a model about how anticommons resources emerge when 
individuals rationally seek to psychologically privatize a commons resource. We maintain that 
certain characteristics of the commons resource, as well as the group, lead to ambiguity 
surrounding what constitutes a fair resource distribution. This ambiguity increases the likelihood 
that individuals will be susceptible to viewing the distribution of the resource through the self-
serving biases of egocentric interpretation of fairness and reactive egoism. Viewing the 
governance of the commons resource egocentrically, individuals will be inclined to over-mark 
and over-defend their psychologically owned portion of the commons. As more of the commons 
resource becomes marked and defended, an anticommons resource is more likely to emerge. The 
carrying capacity of the commons resource moderates the relationship between territorial 
behavior and anticommons resource emergence. These relationships are outlined in Figure 1.  
-------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 Several assumptions are necessary before proceeding. We assume the individuals 
involved psychologically own (portions) of the commons resource. Psychological ownership can 
emerge through an individual using a resource, associating (or identifying) with a resource, or 
investing private resources into the development or maintenance of that resource (Pierce et al., 
2001). Second, we assume that individuals do not share perceptions about what constitutes the 
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appropriate form of commons governance (Weber et al., 2004). Lastly, we assume that the 
organizational authority (which most organizations have) will not step in to adjust and enforce 
property rights involving the commons. This last assumption can be for a variety of reasons, as 
reviewed by Ostrom (1990: 8-12). 
Resource Complexity and Egocentric Views of Fairness 
The complexity of the commons resource impacts the degree of egocentric view of 
fairness experienced by individuals. In particular as a shared resource becomes more difficult to 
subdivide, ambiguity arises as to what constitutes its fair distribution (Budescu, Rapoport, & 
Suleiman, 1990; Messick, 1993). Lumpy resources – such as an office commons with one 
computer and three users – cannot be easily parceled: some are left with more than others 
(Taylor & Ward, 1982). Such cases increase ambiguity regarding which decisions rule is 
appropriate (Weber et al., 2004); e.g., should computer access be a function of employee tenure, 
workload, or skill? Without clarity of appropriateness, individuals are susceptible to egocentric 
views of fairness (de Kwaadsteniet, van Dijk, Wit, de Cremer, & de Rooij, 2007) as an 
individual finds it cognitively easier to access, retrieve, and process positive information about 
the situation that favors self-interests (Babcock & Loewenstein, 1997). Thus,  
Proposition 1a: Individuals will experience egocentric view of fairness when the 
difficulty in dividing the resource is high compared to when it is low. 
Proposition 1b: Individuals will experience egocentric view of fairness when the 
distribution of benefits across potential resource users is unequal compared to when it is 
equal. 
Group Structure and Reactive Egoism 
The structure of the group using the commons resource influences the tendency for an 
individual to react egocentrically to other users. As the number of users of a commons resource 
increases, so does the uncertainty about what those users will do with that resource (Messick & 
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Rutte, 1992). Indeed, social dilemma research in political science (Marinoff, 1999) and 
organization science (McCarter, Rockmann, & Northcraft, 2010) suggests that as group size 
increases, individuals become more concerned with what others will do. Similarly, groups that 
are fractured into subgroups experience greater competition among subgroups over using a 
commons resource (Kramer & Brewer, 1984). This is because in-group members (those 
perceiving to belong to one subgroup) favor their own members while being uncertain about the 
intentions of out-group members (Brewer & Silver, 1978) and possibly become more 
competitive with those groups (Bornstein & Ben-Yossef, 1994). Thus,  
Proposition 2a: Individuals will experience reactive egoism when the number of potential 
users of a commons resource is large compared to when it is small.  
Proposition 2b: Individuals will experience reactive egoism when group differentiation is 
high compared to when it is low.  
Self-serving Biases and Territorial Behavior 
The self-serving biases, egocentric views of fairness and reactive egoism, lead to over-
marking and over-defending of portions of a commons resource. When individuals 
psychologically own an object, and when there is uncertainty surrounding what should “belong” 
to whom, they express that ownership through control-oriented marking (Brown et al., 2005). 
However, if it becomes difficult to determine a fair distribution of a resource, it becomes easier 
for individuals to access, retrieve and process information that supports their own interests and 
needs compared to attempting to do the same for others (Messick & Sentis, 1983). Merging these 
ideas from egocentrism and territoriality, when there is uncertainty about what constitutes a fair 
distribution of a commons resource, individuals, psychologically owning that resource, will 
interpret its distribution egocentrically and over-mark. Furthermore, if they anticipate that others 
will not be as cooperative and fair as they perceive themselves to be in respecting their marked 
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territory (Messick et al., 1985), then individuals may over-defend a territory through anticipatory 
defenses. Thus, based on these proposed relationships, we offer the following three propositions:  
Proposition 3a: Egocentric views of fairness will be positively related to over-marking, 
territorial behaviors.  
Proposition 3b: Reactive egoism will be positively related to over-defending, territorial 
behaviors.  
Proposition 3c: Egocentric views of fairness and reactive egoism will mediate the 
relationship between resource complexity and group structure and territorial behavior.  
Territorial Behavior and Anticommons Emergence 
Furthermore, we maintain that over-marking and over-defending behaviors transform a 
commons resource into an anticommons resource. Property rights theory and territoriality theory 
reminds us that individuals can perceive to own the same (or overlapping) portions of the same 
resource (Alchian, 1977; Brown et al., 2005). The more individuals mark and defend portions of 
a commons resource, the more challenging it becomes for others to access and use the resource. 
This marking and defending can be exacerbated because individuals may perceive they either 
deserve to control more the resource or fear that others will be greedy when marking and 
defending a territory. As a result, access to the commons resource is excessively limited, 
becoming an anticommons resource. Thus,  
Proposition 4: As over-marking and over-defending behavior increases, the likelihood of 
an anticommons resource emerging increases.  
The Moderating Effect of Carrying Capacity  
The carrying capacity of the commons resource will moderate the impact over-marking 
and over-defending behaviors have on anticommons resource emergence. If the commons 
resource is scarce, it may take little marking and defending portions of the commons resource 
before it becomes no longer useable.  In contrast, where there is a bounty of a commons resource 
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available, even individuals marking and defending, what is perceived as, more than their fair 
share will be less likely to lock up the resource. Thus,  
Proposition 5: The carrying capacity of the commons resource will moderate the 
relationship between territorial marking and the emergence of an anticommons resource 
such that the likelihood of territorial behavior leading to anticommons resource 
emergence will be greater when the carrying capacity of the commons resource is low 
compared to when it is high.  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The current paper integrates three independently developed literatures of privatization – 
i.e., property rights, territoriality, and social dilemma literatures – with law and social 
psychology literatures on anticommons resources and self-serving biases to introduce a social 
dilemma of privatization to organization science: Individuals may come to psychologically own 
overlapping portions of a commons resource, mark and defend those overlapping portions, and 
transform a commons resource into an anticommons resource. In doing so, the resource ceases 
being vulnerable to overuse and becomes subject to underuse. This is because multiple 
individuals have means and motive to restrict each other from using the resource. We proposed 
that resource complexity and group structure can create ambiguity about commons resource 
governance. This ambiguity makes individuals susceptible to the self-serving biases of 
egocentric views of fairness and reactive egoism, resulting in over-marking and over-defending a 
commons resource to the point of it becoming an anticommons resource.  
 A bottom-up approach to anticommons emergence pushes our understanding of 
ownership in several ways. First, consider the social dilemma of privatization while navigating 
the tragedy of the commons. Individuals, seeking to manage a shared resource and avoid overuse 
(an inefficient outcome), may take action leading to its underuse – still an inefficient outcome 
(Mukhija, 2005). This social dilemma has particular importance to managers who may encourage 
subordinates to psychologically own their work, in hope increase work morale, output, and 
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accountability (e.g., Vandewalle, Van Dyne, & Kostova, 1995). If the perceive-to-be owned 
resource is shared then what is rational for the individual can become irrational for the 
organization.  
Theorizing how territorial behaviors lead to an emergence of anticommons resources 
highlights the importance of interdependence when multiple individuals perceive they own 
(portions of) the same resource. Our model focuses on how one individual’s territorial behavior 
not only impacts how they use a commons resource, but also how others use it. In discussing the 
consequences of territoriality in organizations, Brown’s research on territoriality primarily focus 
on individual outcomes – such as individual commitment, desire to be isolated from others, and 
preoccupation (Brown et al., 2005; Brown & Robinson, 2011). The current paper complements 
Brown et al.’s (2005: 587) theorizing by looking closer into what can happen when “territorial 
behavior … [does not] create socially agreed upon territories”: the interdependence experienced 
among users of a commons resource creates an environment where one’s territorial behavior 
results in a resource being underutilized by others.  
Interdependence also plays a role in how an individual perceives another’s territorial 
behavior. Tenbrunsel and Northcraft’s (2010) research on perceptions in social dilemmas 
suggests that individuals may intentionally mark and defend a territory to be a wise steward over 
what is (perceived as) theirs while unintentionally coming across to others as non-cooperative. 
The result of this unintentional cooperation is encouragement of others to also be non-
cooperative when using the commons. Ironically, while we tend to consider privatization as 
means of independence, the current paper shows how privatization can strengthen 
interdependence (McWilliams, 2011). However, whether those unintentionally creating the 
anticommons are aware of their interdependence is a different question. Individuals will sacrifice 
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personal welfare to avoid a social burden when they believe that they are (even partially) the 
cause of the crisis compared to when they are not (Kahneman, Ritov, Jacowitz, & Grant, 1993). 
Future research may benefit from examining whether the creation of the anticommons can be 
averted as a function of whether (or not) the creators of it are aware of their shared fate.  
Eggertsson (1999) observed that little weight is given to the social processes influencing 
property rights formation. The current paper shows how “psychological property rights” (van 
den Bergh, 2007) can emerge over a commons resource and, because of self-serving biases – i.e., 
reactive egoism and egocentric views of fairness – these psychological, de facto property rights 
regimes can turn a commons resource into an anticommons resource. Whereas previous property 
rights research focuses on how incentives lead to property right formation (e.g., Alchian, 1977; 
Demsetz, 1967; Hart & Moore, 1990), the current paper brings the role of perceptions into the 
five decade-long discussion of property rights scholarship. This refocus on perceptions 
encourages property rights theorists to consider how incentives to (psychologically) privatize not 
only alter the payoffs of a decision but also how the decision maker’s behavior is perceived and 
responded to by other decision makers. Individuals may be merely responding rationally to 
incentives to mark and defend portions of a commons resource that they perceive as theirs, while 
being perceived by others as being irrational and inappropriate.  
The current paper also complements existing social dilemma research. Previous work 
assumes the only action available to individuals using commons resources is harvesting (Dawes, 
1980; Kopelman et al., 2002). We extend this thinking by discussing how territorial behavior 
over a commons resource can keep others from harvesting. However, doing so creates a second-
order social dilemma. To avoid the tragedy of the commons, it is in each individual’s self-
interest to mark and defend portions of the commons resource that they psychologically own. 
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However if too much of the resource is psychologically privatized, the outcome is in no one’s 
interests: a tragedy of the anticommons emerges. Thus whereas previous research maintains that 
perceiving to be an owner over portions of a commons resource improves the collectives well-
being (e.g., Cass & Edney, 1978; van Dijk & Wilke, 1995), we observe that perceived ownership 
may backfire when we arm users with the ability to restrict (or at least impede) access.  
 Further, we extend the burgeoning work on the anticommons by explicating how the 
suspected “psychological biases” lead to anticommons emergence (Heller, 1998, 2008). Whereas 
the majority of the literature assumes the anticommons’ existence ex ante (e.g., Buchanan & 
Yoon, 2000; van Hiel et al., 2008; Ziedonis, 2004), the current paper shifts focus to how this 
troubling resource comes into being. A bottom-up approach pushes the discussion of 
anticommons – predominantly among legal scholars – from market situations where formal 
authorities (e.g., the state) create anticommons resources using de jure property rights regimes, to 
organizational situations where individuals use de facto property regimes to create an 
anticommons resource out of a commons resource.  
 In discussing how psychological biases enhance the likelihood of anticommons 
emergence, our approach suggests an alternative for how to navigate anticommons resource 
dilemmas. Whereas Heller (2008) would advocate legislation to alter the incentives and structure 
of property rights, our model suggests that creating shared logics (Messick, 1999) about 
appropriate commons governance could avoid an anticommons resource from emerging. This 
latter strategy may be particularly attractive for organizations that value decentralized control 
and a meditational approach to resolving employee disputes (Feldman & Khademian, 2000).  
An English proverb states that “too many cooks can spoil the broth”, implying that too 
many people involved in the same task (resource) reduces the chances of that task (resource) 
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being achieved (Ammer, 2006: 446). We theorize how too many territories can spoil a commons 
resource by transforming it into an anticommons resource. Privatizing a commons resource can 
be an effective way to navigate a tragedy of overuse but only when either there is a “leviathan” 
to dictate and enforce rules (Hobbes, 1907 [1651]) or an agreed upon set of appropriate rules 
(March, 1994). Absent of the former, and individuals may seek to manage a commons resource 
through territorial behavior. Absent of the latter, and individual territorial behavior leads to an 
outcome unfortunate for everyone: a tragedy of the anticommons. 
 
Footnotes 
                                                          
1 This donor intranet vignette, which will be elaborated upon throughout the current paper, 
actually occurred at several of the authors’ institutions.   
2 Territoriality theory complements property rights theory when it comes to ownership. The 
property rights literature assumes that ownership cannot exist with there being a socially agreed 
upon regime of rules defining relationships among people who use things (e.g., ideas, land, 
objects). Ownership does not occur until individuals agree on user rights associated with 
property (e.g., Stake, 2004). In organization science, territoriality theory rests on the concept of 
psychological ownership, a perception and feeling of ownership that translates to an individual 
behavior as if that person does own something, but really does not (e.g., Brown et al., 2005). 
Thus, the territoriality theorist does not presume social agreement for to talk about ownership, 
unlike the property rights theorist. Considering we are focusing on psychological ownership, we 
shall use the word ownership as a territoriality theorist would. 
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FIGURE 1 
A BOTTOM-UP MODEL OF HOW THE TRAGEDY OF THE ANTICOMMONS EMERGES IN ORGANIZATIONS 
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